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REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT 
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v. 
JUNIATA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D. 
BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE IRENE 
BARROWS; ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an 
individual, dba THE PAWN SHOP, 
THE PAWN SHOP, a Utah 
corporation; JAMES ANDERSON, 
AN INDIVIDUAL, dba JIM'S RIBS; 
TERRY PANTELAKIS, an 
individual, dba AAA JEWELERS 
AND LOANS; and LOANS AND SALES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 870235 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS BURGE, BARROWS AND BARROWS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 
the provisions of Sections 3 and 5, Article VIII of the Utah 
Constitution; Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953) (1987 Supp.); 
and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether under the terms of the written Lease agreements 
under which the tenants were occupying the property being 
condemned by these proceedings, the tenants possess a "bonus 
value" as entitles them to share in the proceeds awarded to the 
owners as just compensation. 
2. Whether the owners should be awarded attorney's fees 
incurred in defending against the tenants7 claims of a bonus value 
where the Leases provide that the tenant shall "pay all costs and 
attorney's fees and expenses that shall arise from enforcing the 
terms and provisions of this Lease." 
3. Whether this matter should be remanded to the District 
Court to award additional attorney's fees incurred in defending 
against this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The owners held fee simple title to real property and their 
total tract was condemned by Plaintiff for redevelopment purposes 
leaving no remainder. At the time the action was filed, the 
tenants were in possession at two separate addresses both located 
on the total tract. They were occupying pursuant to two separate 
written Lease agreements identical in their terms except for the 
address and amount of rent payable. 
Both Leases contain the identical "condemnation clause," 
which provides that in the event the property is condemned the 
lease may be terminated at will by either party. The Leases also 
provide that the owners should be awarded attorney's fees if they 
are required to enforce the lease provisions. 
2 
The case was set for jury trial on Monday, February 9, 1987, 
on the issue of valuation, but at the pre-trial conference held at 
2:30 p.m. on Friday, February 6, 1987, the tenants, attorney, 
Brant H. Wall, moved to bifurcate the trial by first having a 
separate trial to determine whether the tenants are entitled to 
receive compensation for the leasehold interests in the subject 
property. That trial was held on Tuesday, February 10, 1987, at 
which the Court heard testimony and received exhibits and other 
evidence as to the tenants' rights to share in the award of just 
compensation and other issues arising under the terms of their 
tenancy. The Court ruled that the leasehold interests of the 
tenants had no "bonus value" for which they should be compensated 
and awarded to the owners costs and attorney's fees for defending 
against the tenants7 claims for compensation asserted contrary to 
the provisions of the Lease. It is from these rulings that the 
tenants herein appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendants, Juniata Irene Burge, Robert D. Barrows, Jr. 
(aka Robert G. Barrows) and Beatrice Irene Barrows (hereinafter 
collectively referred to the "owners") were the owners of real 
property located at 62, 64, and 66 East 200 South (hereinafter the 
"property") in Salt Lake City, Utah. The other Defendants in this 
action were joined because they were tenants occupying the 
property at the time of commencement of this action under written 
3 
Lease agreements identical in all material respects except for the 
Defendant Anderson who occupied the basement at 62 East 2 00 South 
on a month-to-month tenancy pursuant to an oral lease.1 The main 
floors at 62 East 200 South were occupied by the Defendant, Loans 
and Sales, Inc., whose written Lease expired on May 31, 1985, and 
at the time of the commencement of this action it occupied on a 
month-to-month tenancy which it terminated shortly following the 
filing of this action. It claims no interest in these proceedings 
and failed to appear or be represented at trial and was dismissed 
from these proceedings.2 The Defendant Anderson was represented 
and participated at all the proceedings, but was found by the 
Court to have no interest or right to share in an award of just 
compensation for any leasehold interest, and Anderson has not 
appealed that decision and is not a party to these proceedings on 
appeal. 
The Defendants/Appellants, Ellen K. Daskalas, The Pawn Shop 
and Terry Pantelakis (hereinafter collectively referred to as the 
"tenants") , are the only tenants appealing., They were in 
possession of two separate premises at the time the action was 
filed, both located on the total tract, pursuant to two separate 
written Lease agreements identical in their terms except for the 
address and amount of rent payable. The Lease with Pantelakis for 
1
 R.538 (paragraph 2). 
2
 R.546 (paragraph 1). 
4 
the premises at 64 East 200 South is attached to the Addendum as 
Exhibit "A" and the Lease to Daskalas and The Pawn Shop for the 
premises at 66 East 200 South is attached to the Addendum as 
Exhibit "B," both being made a part of this Brief. These separate 
written Leases (hereinafter "Leases") were both entered into on or 
about August 1, 1981, and are for a term of five years with an 
option to renew for an additional five years. The occupancy and 
possession by the tenants continued to run uninterrupted to the 
date of entry of the final Order of Condemnation on June 8, 1987.3 
The pertinent parts of the Leases provide as follows: 
In the event said premises, or any part 
thereof, or the whole or any part of the said 
building shall be taken by right of eminent 
domain . . . after the execution and before 
the termination hereof, this lease may, at the 
election of Lessor or Lessee be terminated; 
provided, however, in such event, Lessee shall 
be entitled to such compensation for 
improvements made to said premises, in an 
amount equal to the compensation received by 
Lessor in respect thereof and as a result 
thereof, regardless of the termination of this 
Lease. (p. 4) 
No holding over by Lessee, however long 
continued, shall operate to renew or extend 
this Lease without Lessor's written consent. 
If Lessee holds possession of said premises 
after the term of this Lease or any renewal 
term thereof, Lessee shall become a tenant 
from month to month, at the rent payable in 
the last installment during the last month of 
the term of this Lease, and upon the terms 
herein specified, and shall continue to be 
such tenant until the tenancy shall be 
3
 R.827. 
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terminated by Lessor or until Lessee shall 
have given Lessor a written notice of at least 
one (1) month of Lessee's intention to 
terminate the tenancy. (p. 5) 
. . . Lessee also agrees to pay all costs and 
attorney's fees and expenses that shall arise 
from enforcing the terms and provisions of 
this Lease. (p.6) 
Lessor grants to Lessee an option to renew 
this Lease for a period of five (5) years 
after the expiration of the term of this Lease 
at a rental to be negotiated at least sixty 
(60) days prior to the expiration of this 
Lease, with all other terms and conditions of 
the renewal Lease to be the same as those 
herein. To exercise this option, Lessee must 
give Lessor written notice of intention to 
extend at least ninety (90) days before this 
Lease expires. (p. 8) 
The property is located on Block 57 and the Plaintiff, 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, brought this action on 
June 24, 1985, to condemn the total tract as part of its 
redevelopment plans for the block.4 On July 31, 1985, the 
tenants, by and through their attorney, Jerome H. Mooney, 
stipulated with the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff has the power of 
eminent domain and right to immediate occupancy.5 The tenants 
entered into the Stipulation based upon an agreement they had to 
lease the property back from the Plaintiff6 so the tenants could 
R.2-7. 
R.71-75. 
R.243-244, 258 (paragraph 2). 
4 
5 
6 
6 
remain in possession longer.7 The owners would not stipulate to 
Plaintiff's occupancy so the Plaintiff filed its Motion for Order 
of Immediate Occupancy on August 1, 1985.8 The Motion was opposed 
by the owners, as set forth in their Answer to Motion for Order of 
Immediate Occupancy, Motion and Notice filed on August 6, 1985,9 
denying Plaintiff's power of eminent domain or need for immediate 
occupancy and moving the Court to find that the tenants have no 
right or claim to any award of just compensation. 
The Motions of the Plaintiff and owners were both noticed for 
hearing on August 13, 1985.10 The owners' Motion and Notice were 
personally served upon the tenants in a timely manner by being 
hand-carried by the owners' attorney, John T. Evans, to the office 
of the tenants' attorney, Jerome H. Mooney.11 
At the hearing on August 13, 1985, the tenants and their 
attorneys failed to appear and the Plaintiff, owners and those 
neighbors who also owned land on Block 57 stipulated to the entry 
7
 The Trial Court concluded that had the Lease not 
terminated upon the filing of the action, it would have 
terminated when the tenants entered into this new lease 
agreement with the Plaintiff, which constituted an 
election by the tenants to terminate their Leases with 
the owners. R.538 (paragraph 3). 
8
 R.38-40. 
9
 R.218-225. 
1 0
 R.224. 
1 1
 R.251-253. 
7 
of the Order of Immediate Occupancy, which Order incorporated the 
provisions of the owners' Motion by ordering that the "tenants 
have no right or claim to the proceeds to be awarded in this 
action as just compensation and that all sums paid pursuant to 
this Order of Immediate Occupancy and by virtue of the final 
Judgment of Just Compensation shall be the sole property off and 
are to be paid directly to the Owner-Defendants, to-wit: Juniata 
Irene Burge, Robert G. Barrows and Beatrice Irene Barrows, without 
notice to or approval by the Tenant-Defendants."12 The Order was 
signed by the Court and entered on August 16, 1985. 
The tenants7 attorney, Jerome Mooney, filed on August 23, 
1985, his Objection to that portion of the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy,13 arguing that the day he was served was the first day 
his office was open at its new location, implying that the Motion 
and Notice were not brought to his attention. Mr. Mooney does 
acknowledge, however, that he was aware of the hearing on August 
13, 1985, and did have possession of the owners7 Answer to 
Complaint, which was hand-delivered to his office at the same time 
as the Answer to Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy, Motion 
and Noticee14 Arguing lack of notice, the tenants filed, on 
1 2
 R.238-239 (Paragraph 3). 
1 3
 R.243-244. 
1 4
 R.257-260. 
8 
August 23, 1985, their Objection to Orderlb asserting a right 
under the Lease agreements to share in the proceeds to be awarded. 
The owners then filed their Motion for Summary Judgment and Notice 
on October 25, 1985, seeking an Order of the Court that the 
tenants had no right to the proceeds and asking that the Court 
award attorney's fees to the owners for being required to enforce 
the condemnation clause of the Leases.16 
Such Motion and Objection were brought on for hearing before 
the Court on November 1, 1985, but the Court did not rule on 
either matter.17 Tenants' Objection to the Order, however, was 
not based on the fact that the Order did not accurately reflect 
the ruling of the Court, and such Order of Immediate Occupancy has 
continued to remain in full force and effect and provides that 
possession of the property will be immediately relinquished by the 
owners at such time as they withdraw any portion of the funds 
deposited by Plaintiff with the Clerk of the Court.18 At the 
conclusion of the hearing, therefor, the tenants asked the Court 
to freeze such funds until the rights of the tenants thereto can 
be determined and the Court did order that such funds be frozen 
and not be distributed to any of the Defendants until further 
1 5
 R.243-244. 
1 6
 R.272-284. 
1 7
 R.302. 
1 8
 R.237-238. 
9 
order, thereby denying the owners the right to withdraw such funds 
or any portion thereof.19 
Trial was set for February 9, 1987, to determine the value of 
the property and the interests therein, but at the pre-trial 
conference held on February 6, 1987, the tenants moved for a 
continuance of that trial and asked the Court to first set a 
separate trial to hear evidence and make its determination as to 
those issues raised in the Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Objection to Order concerning the rights and duties of the 
tenants.20 Accordingly, the matter was brought on for trial 
before the Court sitting without a jury on February 10, 1987, at 
which time the Court heard the testimony of witnesses and other 
evidence, including introduction of exhibits, proffers and the 
arguments of counsel for the Plaintiff, the owners and th€> tenants 
as to the tenants7 rights to share in the award of just 
compensation and other issues arising under the terms of their 
tenancy.21 Following the trial, the Court ordered that the 
tenants have no compensable leasehold interest in the property 
other than a claim for improvements made to the premises, if any. 
1 9
 R.551. 
2 0
 The tenants wanted the trial bifurcated so they would 
not have to go to the expense of participating in a 
three-day trial. No proffer was ever introduced by 
the tenants as to what their evidence would show 
concerning the amount of any bonus value, if any. 
2 1
 R.533. 
10 
The Court further ordered that the owners7 pleadings are amended 
to conform to the evidence and granted the owners' Motion for an 
award of attorney's fees and expenses, pursuant to the attorney's 
fee provision of the Leases.22 
Subsequent to this ruling, a three-day trial was then 
conducted beginning February 23, 1987, as to the issue of the 
value of the property sought to be condemned and the improvements 
thereon and of each interest therein. The tenants failed to 
appear at trial and at no time made any proffer as to what their 
evidence would show as to the amount of any improvements or bonus 
value to which they would be entitled under the Leases. 
Subsequent to the trial, a hearing was held on March 25, 
1987, to rule on various motions, including the amount of 
attorney's fees that should be awarded the owners. At that 
hearing, evidence was admitted as to the amount of time which had 
been incurred by the owners' attorney in connection with the 
tenants' claim, the necessity of incurring those hours and the 
reasonableness of the amount of the fees incurred. This evidence 
was set forth in the owners' Affidavit in Support of Attorney's 
Fees From Tenants23 which was admitted into evidence by 
Stipulation of the parties, subject to Mr. Wall's right of cross-
2 2
 R.546-548. The amount of such fee was not determined 
by the Court until the hearing on May 28, 1987, at 
which time the Court ordered payment of $9,000.00. 
23
 R.456-466. 
11 
examination and without prejudice to his argument that attorney's 
fees should not be awarded.24 At the hearing the Court authorized 
the owners to submit an additional Affidavit regarding attorney's 
fees and ruled that the tenants could have a further hearing on 
the matter to present evidence as to the issue of attorney's fees 
and to afford the tenants their right of cross-examination.25 On 
April 6, 1987, the owners submitted their Supplemental Affidavit 
in Support of Attorney's Fees From Tenants primarily summarizing 
the "record"26 following which Mr. Wall set the matter for 
evidentiary hearing to be held on May 28, 1987. At that time, Mr. 
Wall filed his Affidavit,27 but no further evidence was introduced 
and no cross-examination of the tenants' attorney was sought. The 
matter was argued and submitted on the Affidavits. At the 
conclusion of that hearing, the Court awarded the sum of $9,000.00 
attorney's fees to be paid by the tenants, as noted above, and 
inserted that amount as part of the Order and Judgment, which was 
then entered.28 
Regarding the funds on deposit with the Clerk, the tenants 
filed a Motion after the Court ordered that the tenants had no 
2 4
 R.767-768. 
2 5
 R.501. 
2 6
 R.502-506. 
2 7
 R.524-527. 
2 8
 R.546-548. 
12 
right to the compensation to be paid for the taking of the 
property, seeking an order of the Court releasing its freeze on 
the funds so they could then be paid to the owners.29 That issue 
was also brought on for hearing before the Trial Court on March 
25, 1987. The Court denied that Motion, ordering instead that the 
funds be returned to the Plaintiff.30 At that time, the tenants 
were still occupying the property and making their rent payments 
to the owners, as provided under the Lease Agreements.31 The 
Court ordered that the tenants continue to pay their rent payments 
directly to the owners until the Redevelopment Agency obtained 
possession of the property,32 which occurred on June 8, 1987, when 
the Plaintiff filed its Final Order of Condemnation.33 In other 
words, during all the proceedings from the time of the filing of 
this action to the date the owners lost all interest in the 
property, the tenants remained in undisturbed possession of their 
premises at the same contract rents provided for in the Lease 
agreements. 
2 9
 R.476-479. 
3 0
 R.552 (Paragraph 6). 
3 1
 TR. (R.827). 
32
 R.550 (Paragraph 4). 
33
 R.560-562. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case was set for jury trial on February 9, 1987, to 
determine the issue as to the value of the property, including 
improvements thereon, and of each interest therein. The tenants 
would have had an opportunity to present evidence and testimony as 
to the extent of damages and right to participate in any award 
made by the jury. The tenants waived that right when, at the pre-
trial conference on February 6, 1987, they moved for a continuance 
of the trial and asked the Court to first rule at a preliminary 
trial as to whether the tenant had any compensable intercut under 
the Leases. It was the tenants' intent and purpose to avoid going 
to trial on the issue of how much their compensable interest would 
be and at no time did the tenants make any proffer as to what 
their evidence would show as to the amount of such value, if any. 
The tenants were not prejudiced by not participating in the 
trial to determine the value of property interests where they had 
no bonus value under the Lease. The tenants were granted a trial 
as to the issue of whether they had a right to share in the award 
of just compensation and other issues arising under the terms of 
their tenancy, at which they were given full opportunity to 
present witnesses and other evidence and argue the matter before 
the Court. 
The Trial Court correctly found that the tenants had no 
compensable interest under the Lease Agreements because either the 
14 
Leases terminated at the time of filing of this action, or, if 
they did not terminate, the tenants under the lease provisions had 
no greater leasehold rights than that of a month-to-month tenant 
and, in any event, suffered no damages prior to the date of 
termination because they were allowed to remain in possession for 
the same rents. 
The attorney's fee provisions of the Leases are controlling. 
The Trial Court's award was substantiated by the evidence, and 
there were no procedural defects. Also, additional attorney's 
fees should be awarded to the owners under the provisions of the 
Leases for defending against this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TENANTS HAD FULL OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE 
AT TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THEY HAD A 
COMPENSABLE LEASEHOLD INTEREST AND THE 
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THEY 
HAD NO RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY AWARD 
As a general rule, a tenant, losing its leasehold interest in 
property due to a condemnation proceeding, is entitled to be 
compensated if its lease has what is sometimes referred to as a 
"bonus value," that value being the difference between present 
worth of the market value of the unexpired term of the lease and 
the present value of the rents required to be paid under the 
15 
lease.34 Both Leases in question contain a condemnation clause 
known as an "optional termination clause," which provides that in 
the event the property is condemned the lease may be terminated at 
will by either party.35 The real question before this Court is 
whether a lease with such a provision gives the tenants a "bonus 
value" such as will allow them to share in the owners' award of 
just compensation. The Trial Court ruled that the condemnation 
clause in the lease precludes the tenants from having a bonus 
value and the tenants are appealing that ruling.36 
The tenants argue that the lease did not terminate until 
January 31, 1987,37 which was after they gave notice to the owners 
of the tenants' intention to renew the Lease,38 and had they been 
afforded the right to trial they could have proven a bonus value 
during that period. It is the owners position that (A) the 
tenants were given a full and fair trial on the issue of whether 
3 4
 State Road Commission v. Brown, 531 P.2d 1294, 1285 (Utah 
1975). 
3 5
 Page 4 of Leases. 
3 6
 The condemnation clause also allowed the tenants to be 
reimbursed for improvements made to the property, if any, 
that is not an issue in this appeal inasmuch as the Trial 
Court allowed the tenants to present such evidence, but 
the tenants waived that right, concluding they had no 
valid claim to any improvements on the premises. 
(Conclusions of Law, Page 8, Paragraph 5). 
3 7
 Brief of Appellants, Page 9. 
3 8
 Brief of Appellants, Page 8. 
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the tenants had any bonus value under their Leases; (B) the Trial 
Court properly ruled that the Leases had no such bonus value; 
therefore, (C) the tenants were not entitled to a trial as to what 
the amount of any such bonus value would be. 
A. 
THE TENANTS RECEIVED A FULL AND FAIR TRIAL AS 
TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THERE WAS ANY BONUS 
VALUE UNDER THE LEASES 
The tenants seem to question whether they received a fair 
hearing as to the issue of whether there was a bonus value under 
the Leases39 Upon the tenants motion, the Trial Court granted a 
special trial setting to determine that issue that was held on 
February 10, 1987,40 at which the parties were present, together 
with other witnesses. It was not simply a hearing on a Motion for 
Summary Judgment submitted on Affidavit, but testimony was taken, 
proffers were made and exhibits were introduced concerning 
interpretation of the Lease provisions, whether there was an 
extension of the original term of the Lease, what rent was 
received and whether its receipt was evidence of such an 
39
 The tenants state that their first issue presented for 
review is, "whether or not the Trial Court erred in 
ruling, as a matter of law, that the filing of the 
condemnation action by the Plaintiff served to terminate 
the leasehold interests of the tenants, and thus deprive 
the tenants of the right to a full evidentiary trial 
on the issue of damages and just compensation." (Brief 
of Appellants, Page 3). 
4 0
 TR. (R. 625-743). 
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extension, and what notices of election to terminate were given.4i 
The Trial Court then entered its Conclusions of Law42 and Order 
and Judgment,43 correctly ruling that the tenants had no bonus 
value under the Leases. The tenants were not denied a trial to 
present evidence as to bonus value as alleged. 
B. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT NO BONUS VALUE 
EXISTED UNDER THE LEASES 
The tenants were not entitled to share in any award of just 
compensation because (1) the taking of an entire tract or parcel 
terminates a tenants interest under a lease with an "optional 
termination clause; (2) a leasehold interest which can be 
terminated by the lessor at will has no bonus value; and (3) the 
See page 2 of tenants7 Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Disposition on file herein dated 
August 7, 1987. 
3. The provisions under the Daskalas and Pantelakis 
Leases are controlling and such Leases terminated as 
of the commencement of this action against the 
Defendants and, in any event, would have terminated 
upon tenants' agreement with the Plaintiff to enter 
into a new lease arrangement, or upon the owners' 
filing of their Motion for Summary Judgment, or upon 
the service upon the tenants of the owners' election 
of termination. (R.538). 
2. The tenants, Anderson, Daskalas and Pantelakis 
shall not receive compensation or share in an award 
herein of just compensation for any leasehold interest 
in the subject property, but may present evidence at 
the trial of just compensation as to the amount the 
tenants would be entitled to receive for improvements 
made to the premises, if any. (R.546). 
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tenants are not entitled to compensation where the election to 
terminate has been made, especially while remaining in possession 
prior to actual termination of the lease. 
1. Optional termination clauses are commonly upheld by the 
courts and no ambiguity is found contrary to the tenants 
assertion.44 The need to make an election to terminate only 
applies, however, when there has been a partial taking in 
condemnation because its purpose is to determine whether the 
remainder parcel will continue to be leased. The courts have 
held, therefore, that in the event of a total taking of property, 
the filing of an election to terminate becomes moot and "has no 
meaning whatever, since there is nothing to 'opt' for."45 
Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. v. Boston Terminal Co.,46 interpreted 
an optional termination clause where there was a partial taking. 
The Court noted that had there been a total take the tenants' 
rights would have terminated without an election: 
We are of the opinion that the judgment 
appealed from was right. Of course, any valid 
taking of the whole premises would put an end 
to the lease . . . and therefore the provision 
quoted must not be construed too liberally in 
its application to the present case. The 
4 4
 96 ALR2d 1140, 1155. 
4 5
 Beherer Holding Corp. v. State, 26 Misc 2d 388, 209 NYS 
2d 899, 903 (1961). See also, In Re Improvement of 
Third Street, 178 Minn 552, 228 N.W. 162 (1929); 96 
ALR2d 1140 at 1160 (Section ll[b]). 
4 6
 176 Mass 115, 57 N.E. 214, (1900). 
19 
object is that which is pointed out in Munigle 
v. City of Boston, 3 Allen, 230, 232, and the 
meaning is that the landlord can terminate the 
right of the tenant to share in the damages, • 
. . Probably, if the clause had not dealt with 
the taking of a part as well as of the whole, 
and had referred only to a taking of the 
whole, it would have stipulated absolutely 
that the tenant's rights should end without 
requiring an election by the landlord. The 
election is inserted with reference to a 
partial taking. In this case, the election 
was sufficiently manifested by the notice. 
Id. at 215. 
The condemnation of the subject property constitutes a total 
taking of all the property subject to the Leases. There is no 
remainder parcel that will be available to the tenants following 
these proceedings, hence no formal election of termination is 
necessary, the tenants lease term terminated upon the filing of 
the court action and the tenants have no bonus value. 
2. Even if the Leases were not terminated by the filing of 
the action, there would still be no bonus value because the lessor 
could at any time elect to terminate the Lease without cause, and 
when such election is made, the tenants would have no right to 
remain on the property longer than one month.47 The most the 
tenants would have would be a month-to-month tenancy, which, 
because of its short term nature, is not such an €>state or 
interest in condemned property as entitles the tenant to 
Lease, Paragraph 5. 
compensation.48 Possession could even be terminated sooner if the 
Plaintiff took possession pursuant to the Court's Order of 
Immediate Occupancy, which possession had already been agreed to 
by the tenants as set forth in their Stipulation of Tenant-
Defendants for Order of Immediate Occupancy.49 A lease which can 
be terminated at will and without cause has no bonus value. 
3. Cases uniformly hold that, when an option to terminate 
is exercised by the lessor under the "optional termination 
clauses" of a lease, such election bars the tenants from sharing 
in the award of just compensation: 
Where a lease, under which the tenant holds, 
provides that the lessor has the option of 
terminating the lease in the event the 
property is subsequently taken by eminent 
domain proceedings, and it further appears 
that the lessor has given such notice of his 
intention to terminate as may be required by 
the particular Lease, it has been held that 
the lessor by exercising his option to 
terminate bars the lessee from sharing in the 
damages awarded for the condemnation of the 
property. 96 ALR2d 1140, 1155, citing 
Strazzulla Bros. Co. v. Fargo Real Estate 
Trust. 152 F2d 61 (1945) CA Mass); United 
States v. 3.5 Acres of Land, 57 F.Supp 548 
(1944, DC Mass); Sparrow Chisholm Co. v. 
Boston, 327 Mass 64 97 N.E. 2d 172 (1951); 
State v. Sheets, 48 Wash 2d 65, 290 P.2d 974 
(1955). 
4 8
 "A tenant from month-to-month, it has been held, has no 
such interest as entitles him to compensation." 
2 Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain, Section 5.06[4] nt. 
67 at p. 5-129 (Rel. 31-11/82 Pub. 460). 
4 9
 R.71-75. 
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The Trial Court found that even had the commencement of the 
action not terminated the Leases, an election to terminate had 
still taken place. It occurred "upon tenants' agreement with 
Plaintiff to enter into a new lease arrangement, or upon the 
owners filing of their Motion for Summary Judgment, or upon the 
service upon the tenants of the owners7 Election of 
Termination."50 
Election by the tenants occurred at the time the action 
commenced. On July 30, 1985, the tenants acknowledged acceptance 
of service51 and the very next day entered into a Stipulation with 
the Plaintiff agreeing that the Plaintiff had the right to possess 
the property52 and entered into an agreement to lease the property 
back from the Plaintiff.53 There is no way that the tenants could 
enter into such an agreement without having taken the position 
that their lease with the owners was terminated. 
Election by the owners was made known on August 6, 1985, when 
the owners filed their Answer to Motion for Order of Immediate 
Occupancy, Motion and Notice seeking a Court Order that the 
tenants have no right or claim to the proceeds to be awarded in 
5 0
 R.538. 
5 1
 R.34-35. 
5 2
 R.71-75. 
5 3
 R.243-244, 258. 
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this action,b4 and the Court so ordered in its Order of Immediate 
Occupancy.55 Following the Objection thereto by the tenants, the 
owners filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on October 25, 
1985, again seeking further Order that the tenants had no right to 
compensation under the Lease Agreements. Then, if that was not 
enough to put the tenants on notice that they had no bonus value 
under the Leases, the owners filed with the Court a formal Notice 
of Election confirming the termination of the Leases, which Notice 
was served upon the tenants and their attorneys on or about 
February 2, 1987, and was introduced, together with the cover 
letter to Mr. Mooney, into evidence as Exhibit 8 at the trial on 
February 10, 198756 (a copy of which Exhibit is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "C" and made a part hereof). As the tenants admit, there 
is absolutely no question that after January 31, 1987, the Leases 
were terminated and the tenants were barred from sharing in the 
award for the condemnation, and prior to that time the tenants 
remained in possession anyway under the old rents as discussed 
below. 
c. 
TENANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A TRIAL AS TO 
THE AMOUNT OF BONUS VALUE 
5 4
 R.223. 
5 5
 R.238. 
5 6
 Brief of Appellants, p. 6; R.693-709. 
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The tenants7 argument seems to be that an optional 
termination clause is not self-executing at the time an action is 
filed even where there is a taking of the total tract and, 
therefore, the owners are entitled to whatever bonus value existed 
from that filing until the tenants served their formal Election of 
Termination, and they should have been allowed to present evidence 
as to that value at trial. The tenants were not entitled to such 
a trial, however, for the following reasons: 
1. As noted above a lease that has an optional termination 
clause has no bonus value where there is a total taking or either 
party made an election to terminate. But, even if there were a 
bonus value, the tenants have no cause to complain, because they 
have already received the benefit by continuing in possession well 
beyond the time the formal Election of Termination was served by 
the owners.57 In other words, even if the economic or market value 
rent were greater than the rent provided for in the Leases, the 
tenants remained in possession of the property under the same 
lease or contract rent and, therefore, received the benefit of 
any such bonus value. This principle is stated as follows: 
Where, prior to entry of judgment in the 
condemnation proceeding, lessee enjoys the 
balance of the demised term without being 
interfered with in any way by the condemnor, 
he is not entitled to share in the 
condemnation award made to the owners of the 
land. Similarly, where the lessee alleging a 
5 7
 Brief of Appellants, p. 8. 
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de facto taking could have remained on the 
property, but did not, he did not suffer any 
compensable loss.58 
The Plaintiff admits that the right to a bonus value does not 
extend beyond the time the election is made.59 Even under the 
tenants7 theory of the case, therefor, they have already received 
everything they were entitled to by way of bonus value by being 
allowed to remain in possession until after the Notice of 
Election, so the tenants were not prejudiced by their failure to 
present evidence as to the amount of the bonus value. 
2. Any failure of the tenants to have a trial as to the 
amount of bonus value was due to their own voluntary waiver of 
their participation. The case was set for trial on February 9, 
1987, as to all issues regarding the value of the property and 
interests therein, at which all parties were to attend and present 
evidence. But the tenants moved to bifurcate that trial and have 
the Court first determine the rights of the tenants. They did not 
want to sit through a three-day valuation trial if the Court were 
going to rule anyway that they had no compensable interest. They 
made no proffer as to what their evidence would show and did not 
really want such a trial. 
5 8
 Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain, Section 12.42[1] at 
p. 12-775 (Rel. No. 21-11/77). 
59
 "Where an 'optional termination clause7 exists, the right 
to share in just compensation exists until an 'election7 
is made terminating the lease." Brief of Appellants, 
p. 12. 
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The Court's ruling against the tenants was not a final order 
from which they can appeal, and by failing to appear at the 
valuation trial or to make any proffer as to what their evidence 
would have shown as to whether they were damaged, they waived 
their right to now claim prejudice that they were not given an 
opportunity to be heard. Had they wanted to present evidence as 
to valuation, they had the opportunity to do so and should not 
have asked for the bifurcation, or at least should have made a 
proffer. 
3. Giving notice to extend the lease does not create bonus 
value. The tenants make a number of statements in their Brief 
about having given notice of intention to renew the lease and 
thereby extend the term thereof. Evidence of an extension was not 
clear and the Trial Court made no ruling as to whether there was 
an extension.60 At the trial, the tenants proffered that timely 
notices of extension were served, but the tenants denied having 
received such notices.61 
Even had notice been given, however, it would not have caused 
renewal of the lease because the lease had already been terminated 
pursuant to the condemnation clause, as discussed above and there 
was nothing to renew. There was no renegotiation as to new lease 
payments under a renewal lease, as was required to be done at 
6 0
 R.550 (Paragraph 2). 
6 1
 R.721-724. 
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least sixty days prior to expiration of the old lease.62 There 
can be no contract agreement until the new rental price is agreed 
to. There was no writing evidencing the renewal of a lease and no 
renewal can occur without the lessor's written consent.63 
Receipt of the rent by the owners after termination of the 
Lease was not acquiescence by the owners of renewal. Rents were 
received pursuant to the paragraph on page 5 of the Lease, under 
which the tenants remain in possession on a month-to-month basis 
after the Lease terminates. Tenants understood this, or they 
would not have remained in possession and continued to pay rents 
after the date they acknowledge receiving Notice of Termination on 
or about January 31, 1987, nor after the Trial Court ruled on 
February 10, 1987, that the Leases had terminated. Staying in 
possession does not imply they had a legal right to remain in 
possession. The cases cited by the tenants in support of their 
position that the conduct of the owners in accepting rents 
constituted an extension of the Leases are not helpful because 
they do not involve the interpretation of Leases resembling in any 
way the subject Leases. Ochsner v. Langendorf64 allowed an 
extension of an oral lease of agricultural property on which crops 
6 2
 Page 8 of Leases. 
6 3
 Page 5 of Leases. 
6 4
 175 P.2d 392 (Colo. 1946). 
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were planted. Standards Parts' Co. v. D. & J, Investment Co.OD 
allowed an extension because the written lease contained no 
provision as to how or when the option to extend was to be 
exercised and the tenant had built a large building on the 
premises. 
Even had there been a lease properly renewed and 
renegotiated, it would not have created any bonus value because 
the new lease payments would have been renegotiated for the full 
fair market rent and, hence, there would be no difference between 
the economic rent and the contract (lease) amounts and any renewal 
lease would still have the same condemnation clause and be subject 
to termination at will by the lessor,66 hence, a renewal lease 
would give no greater bonus value to the original lease no matter 
what the term of renewal. Also, placing any value upon an 
extension of the Lease would be in violation of Section 78-34-11, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), which provides that, "No improvements put 
upon the property subsequent to the date of service of summons 
shall be included in the assessment of compensation or damages." 
The tenants could not seek a greater award due to improving its 
position through some action or conduct subsequent to the date of 
take. 
6 5
 288 P.2d 369 (Okla. 1955). 
6 6
 Page 8 of Leases. 
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In conclusion, the Lease by its terms has no value to the 
tenants in the event of condemnation. When they signed the Lease, 
the tenants agreed that, in the event of an eminent domain action, 
the Lease could be terminated at will and without cause by either 
party simply by the act of electing to do so, and such election 
bars the tenants from sharing in the compensation. Even assuming 
the Lease was not terminated until the formal Election of 
Termination was served by the owners dated January 31, 1987, that 
election was made in a timely manner in full compliance with the 
Lease while the tenants were still enjoying possession under the 
same rents. The leasehold interest had no value. 
Even if the tenants were entitled to compensation during the 
thirteen months that remained under the lease term after the date 
of taking, the tenants were not damaged during that period. They 
continued to have the same possession and use of the premises 
without interruption at the same rents provided for in the Leases. 
If there were a bonus value before termination, the tenants have 
received the benefit of it. 
In fact, however, the Lease had no value as of the date of 
take because it could be terminated at will by either party. If 
the tenants on that date had tried to sell that Lease to a 
knowledgeable buyer based on an alleged bonus value, they would 
have found no takers, because it could be terminated instantly 
with no remedy to the tenant. The tenants, therefore, have waived 
29 
any right to share in an award of compensation to be paid under 
the condemnation laws of this State. 
POINT II 
THE OWNERS ARE ENTITLED TO ALL COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND EXPENSES ARISING FROM ENFORCING THE 
CONDEMNATION CLAUSE IN THE LEASES 
The award of attorney's fees provided for in a lease depends 
upon the particular language used.67 The language of the Leases 
under which the owners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
provides as follows: 
It is hereby agreed that if Lessee shall 
default in making any or all rental payments, 
keeping any or all terms, conditions or 
covenants of this Lease, abandon said 
premises, become bankrupt or make an 
assignment for the benefit of creditors, then 
and in any of said cases, Lessor may, after 
five (5) days written notice allowing Lessee 
to cure any such default, re-enter upon said 
premises and, at Lessor's option, annul and 
make void this Lease as to all future rights 
of Lessee, anything herein to the contrary 
notwithstanding. Lessee covenants and agrees 
that in case of termination accomplished 
pursuant to provisions of this paragraph, 
Lessee will indemnify Lessor against all loss 
of rents or other payments which, but for such 
termination, Lessor would have been entitled 
to receive under the terms and provisions of 
this Lease, and also against all attorney's 
"It is not uncommon now for parties to a lease to make 
provisions for the allowance of attorneys' fees. Such 
provisions are not uniform as respects details. It is 
obvious that the right of a lessor or lessee to recover 
such fees involves the construction of the particular 
language used, in the light of the facts and 
circumstances appearing." 49 Am Jur 2d, Landlord and 
Tenant, Section 189 at 212. 
30 
fees and expenses incurred by Lessor in 
enforcing any of the terms and provisions of 
this Lease.6^ (Emphasis added.) 
Lessee also agrees to pay all costs and 
attorney's fees and expenses that shall arise 
from enforcing the terms and provisions of 
this Lease.69 
The tenants argue that if the Leases terminated, then the 
attorney's fee provisions are no longer binding between the 
parties, but it can be seen that this argument is specifically 
anticipated by the Leases in providing that the tenants have a 
duty to pay attorney's fees to the owners even if the owners 
"annul and make void this Lease." In this matter, however, the 
contract was not void and did not cease to exist as alleged by the 
tenants. Even when the five-year term of the Lease terminated at 
the time of the filing of this action, as determined by the Trial 
Court, a landlord/tenant relationship continued between the 
parties, which was governed by the Leases. The Lease agreements 
did not terminate, only the right to remain in possession the full 
five years terminated. The tenants remained in possession on a 
month-to-month tenancy still subject to the same Leases, which, of 
course, still included the same condemnation clause and attorney's 
fee provisions. This is provided in the Leases as follows: 
No holding over by lessee, however long 
continued, shall operate to renew or extend 
6 8
 Page 5 of Leases. 
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this Lease without Lessor's written consent. 
If Lessee holds possession of said premises 
after the term of this Lease or any renewal 
term thereof, Lessee shall become a tenant 
from month to month, at the rent payable in 
the last installment during the last month of 
the term of this Lease, and upon the terms 
herein specified, and shall continue to be 
such tenant until the tenancy shall be 
terminated by Lessor or until Lessee shall 
have given Lessor a written notice of at least 
one (1) month of Lessee's intention to 
terminate the tenancy.70 
Attorney's fees can be recovered in accordance with such 
provision in a written lease, even if the lease has terminated.71 
BLT Inv. Co. v. Snow,72 cited by the tenants in support of their 
position that fees cannot be awarded after termination is not in 
point. As explained, the Leases before this Court remained 
binding agreements governing the contractual relationship of the 
parties, even after the tenants' rights to the full five-year term 
were terminated. However, in BLT Inv. Co. v. Snow, supra. , the 
Court found there never had been a contract between the parties. 
A written contract had been executed which omitted important 
escrow provisions, without which the seller refused to perform. 
The Trial Court was affirmed in finding that the contract was not 
complete without those escrow provisions and, therefore, it 
rescinded the executed document holding, in effect, that the 
Page 5 of Leases. 
Petersen v. Hodges. 121 Utah 72, 239 P.2d 180 (1951). 
586 P.2d 456 (Utah 1972). 
70 
71 
72 
contract of the parties was never finalized and, therefore, never 
came into effect. The partial agreement was not "terminated." It 
was rescinded and voided as though it never came into existence. 
BLT Inv. Co. , supra., did not involved a binding agreement which 
had governed the relationship of the parties for four years before 
the filing of a condemnation action and continued thereafter to 
govern the contractual relationship of the parties, including its 
provisions for attorney's fees, as is the case with our Leases. 
The tenants argue that attorney's fees cannot be awarded 
because the owners failed to comply with Rules 13(f) and 15(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in that the owners failed to file a 
cross-claim and the tenants did not consent to amendment of the 
pleadings to conform to the evidence regarding attorney's fees. 
Rule 13(f), however, clarifies what claims may be stated in a 
cross-claim. It does not preclude the determination of such 
claims where there is compliance with Rule 15(b). The tenants' 
consent to amendment of the pleadings is not a requirement of Rule 
15(b), contrary to Plaintiff's assertion. Rule 15(b) has a second 
part to it which allows the Court to amend the pleadings when the 
parties do not consent. This was explained in General Insurance 
Company of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp.,73 cited in the 
tenants' Brief, which the Court cited with approval the 
explanation in Moore's Federal Practice: 
7 3
 545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976). 
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The treatise by Moore explains that an 
amendment to conform to evidence may be made 
at any time on motion of any party. The 
parties may, by express consent, or by the 
introduction of evidence without objection, 
amend the pleadings at will. During the trial 
if a party expressly requests leave to amend 
to conform pleadings to the proof adduced and 
to reflect issues raised by either express or 
implied consent, such leave should be 
granted.74 
The first part of Rule 15(b) should be 
contrasted with the second part where an 
amendment is offered during trial in response 
to an objection to evidence. In such a case, 
the standards set forth in the second part of 
Rule 15(b) will apply, viz., leave may be 
granted in the absence of prejudice, undue 
delay, or laches.7^ 
The General Insurance case, supra, is not in point because it 
involves the first part of Rule 15(b), where the evidence upon 
which a party based its motion to amend was introduced without 
objection, and thus, the issue was tried by implied consent. In 
our case, the owners7 evidence as to attorney's fees was objected 
to by the tenants as raising an issue not founded upon a proper 
pleading. Over the tenants' objections, the Trial Court properly 
granted the owners' Motion to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to 
the Evidence as to attorney's fees,76 pursuant to the second part 
of Rule 15(b), which provides as follows: 
3 Moore's Federal Practice, (2d Ed.), Sec. 15.13[2], 
p. 989-991. 
Id. at p. 991. 
R.539 (Paragraphs 7 and 8), and 546 (Paragraph 3). 
74 
75 
76 
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. . . If evidence is objected to at the trial 
on the ground that it is not within the issues 
made by the pleadings, the Court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended when the presentation 
of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the objecting party fails to 
satisfy the court that the admission of such 
evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The 
court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, 
to enable the objecting party to meet such 
evidence. 
The tenants to do not even argue that they were prejudice in 
maintaining their defense against the owners7 claim for attorney's 
fees by the admission of evidence pertaining thereto. In fact, 
the tenants admit that "the issue of attorney's fees was not new 
at trial, but raised in owners' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
objected to at that time based upon improper pleading."77 Tenants 
were put on notice sixteen months prior to trial that attorney's 
fees were an issue. 
No cross-claim against the tenants for attorney's fees was 
included in the owners' Answer to Complaint because that Answer 
was filed before it was known that the tenants would assert a 
claim. The owners' Answer was filed approximately August 6, 1985, 
and the Trial Court found in its Order of Immediate Occupancy 
entered August 16, 1985, that the "tenants have no right or claim 
to the proceeds to be awarded in this action as just 
compensation." It was not until the tenants filed their Answer on 
Brief of Appellants, p. 18. 
or about August 22, 1985, that the owners learned of tenants' 
claim. The tenants were then immediately put on notice that the 
owners were seeking attorney's fees, because the owners filed 
their Motion for Summary Judgment asking that attorney's fees 
might be awarded against the tenants arising out of their claim. 
The Motion was served on the 16th day of October, 1985. It was 
the tenants who asked the Court to set the matter for trial on 
February 10, 1987, as to those issues raised by the owners in 
their Motion for Summary Judgment,78 giving them some sixteen 
months to prepare as to the issue of attorney's fees. The Court 
then set the matter as to the amount of attorney's fees for 
another hearing held March 25, 1987. The tenants were served on 
March 15, 1987, with the owners' Affidavit in Support of 
Attorney's Fees From Tenants, which Affidavit was admitted into 
evidence at the hearing on March 25, 1987.79 At that hearing, the 
tenants asked for a further evidentiary hearing as to the amount 
of fees and to cross-examine the owners' attorney on this issue.80 
Additional Affidavits were submitted by the owners81 and the 
tenants82 and further evidentiary hearing was conducted on May 28, 
7 8
 R.533. 
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 R.768. 
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 R.810. 
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 R.502-506. 
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 R.524-527. 
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1987. The matter was submitted on those Affidavits without any 
further introduction of evidence nor cross-examination on the part 
of the tenants' attorney. At that time, the Court determined that 
attorney's fees in the sum of $9,000.00 was reasonable and entered 
a judgment to that effect.83 
It certainly cannot be said that the tenants did not have 
sufficient notice to enable them to meet the evidence as to 
attorney's fees or were otherwise prejudiced by the owners' claim. 
The Trial Court properly exercised its discretion to amend the 
pleadings to conform to the evidence and this appeal should not be 
resolved upon any alleged procedural defects, but upon the merits 
of the case requiring an interpretation of the written Lease 
Agreements between the parties.84 
Lastly, the tenants argue that the owners' "Affidavit is 
insufficient on its face for the award of attorney's fees."85 
R.542, 547. 
"The Court may permit the pleadings to be amended in its 
discretion, and amendment is to be freely allowed in 
order to aid in the presentation of the merits of the 
controversy, if the opposing party is not actually 
prejudice. The party opposing the amendment should not 
succeed by arguing a technical change in the 'cause of 
action' or 'defense,' since that merely means 'legal' 
and not 'actual' surprise. He must show that he would 
be prejudice in maintaining his action or defense on the 
merits by the admission of the evidence." 3 Moore's 
Federal Practice, (2d Ed.), Section 15.14, p. 15-137 
(1985). 
Brief of Appellants, p. 18. 
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There were two Affidavits in Support of Attorney's Fees From 
Tenants86 upon which the Court based its ruling. The first was 
admitted into evidence by Stipulation at the hearing on March 25, 
1987, on the owners' Motion for Attorney's Fees.87 The owners' 
Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees From 
Tenants88 was submitted on April 6, 1987. 
The Affidavits before the Court are specific to the effect 
that 133 hours in attorney's time was necessarily incurred solely 
as a result of the actions taken by the tenants and not for any 
other work incurred in connection with this condemnation. The 
Affidavit sets forth a breakdown as to what work was performed 
during those various hours, that the hours were "necessarily 
incurred,"89 and great detail was given as to why it was necessary 
to incur that time. The Affidavit qualifies the owners' attorney 
to state his opinion that "$100.00 per hour represents the 
prevailing market rate" for similar legal services in the area,90 
and the Affidavit goes into nine pages of detail explaining the 
novelty, difficulty and nature of the issues that were involved 
requiring research, analysis and drafting for nine separate 
8 6
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pleadings comprising 56 pages, plus preparation and attendance at 
five separate Court hearings, including the trial on the issue of 
the tenants7 rights and the hearing on May 28, 1987. 
The Trial Court can also take judicial notice from the 
pleadings of the amount involved and results obtained, which 
reveal that the tenants were seeking in excess of $273,000,00 for 
their leasehold interests91 resulting in no award. Not only was 
there sufficient evidence for the Trial Court to base its award of 
attorney's fees, but it is submitted that it is more likely that 
the Trial Court erred in not awarding more than the $9,000.00. 
POINT III 
THE OWNERS SHOULD BE AWARDED COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES NECESSARILY INCURRED 
IN DEFENDING AGAINST THIS APPEAL 
Inasmuch as an award of attorney's fees is required by the 
provisions of the Leases, the owners seek to have this Court grant 
further attorney's fees necessarily incurred in defending against 
this appeal and to remand this case to the District Court for its 
determination of reasonable attorney's fees and costs to be 
granted to the owners arising out of the appeal of this case.92 
R.247 (Paragraph 11). 
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 
617 P.2d 406 (Utah, 1980). 
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CONCLUSION 
The tenants had a full and fair trial as to the issue of 
whether they held any bonus value under their Leases and the Trial 
Court properly found that the condemnation clause contained in the 
Leases precluded the tenants from sharing in any award to the 
owners of just compensation, especially in view of the fact that 
the taking was of the total tract and an election of termination 
was made by one or both parties in full compliance with the 
requirements of the Leases. Also, the issue as to attorney's fees 
was properly before the Trial Court and the evidence before the 
Court fully supported the Court's award. This Court shouLd affirm 
the Trial Court's Order and Judgment and Order on Post-Trial 
Motions and other findings as they affect the interests of the 
tenants in these proceedings denying the tenants any bonus value 
under the Leases and awarding $9,000.00 in attorney's fees and to 
remand this case to the District Court with instructions to 
determine a reasonable attorney's fee to be awarded the owners for 
the appeal of this case. i 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this O / " day of March, 1988. 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
B Y - / / / / / / / >(,iaa;) 
JOHN^T. EVANS 
orneys for Defendants/Respondents 7 
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ADDENDUM 
43 
L E A S E 
THIS INEENTUKE OF LEASE made and entered into as 
of the 1st day of August 19 81 , by and 
between BEATRICE BARRCWS, ROBERT G. BARROWS, AND JUNE SURGE, a l l 
individuals of Salt Lake City, Utah, hereinafter referred to as 
"L£SSOR," and Terry Pantelakis dba 
AAA Jewelry & Loans
 9 hereinafter referred to as 
"LESSEE;" 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
That in consideration of the rental , covenants and 
agreements herein reserved and contained on the part of the 
Lessee to be paid, performed and observed, Lessor does hereby 
lease, demise and l e t unto Lessee, and Lessee does hereby hire 
and take from Lessor, the premises known and described as: 
64 East 2nd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
10 HAVE AND TO HOLD said premises for a period of 
Five (5) years beginning the 1st day of August 
19 81 . 
Lessee shal l pay Lessor the sun of $ 4,800.00 
payable at the ra te of $ 400.00 p ^ month, monthly in 
advance, on the 1st day of each and every month for a 
period of Sixty (fift\ Tiaaths, aacmservcir^ August 1 _. 
19 81 . 
- 2 -
Notices, payments and other conmunications herein 
provided or hereby contenplated shall be considered duly delivered 
when mailed by either registered or ordinary first-class mail, 
postage prepaid, to Lessor at 777 Barrows Avenue, Salt Lake City. 
Utah, and to Lessee at 66 East and Second South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111
 # 
This Lease shall not be assigned, and neither said 
premises nor any part thereof shall be let or underlet, nor used 
nor permitted to be used for other than retail store or office 
or warehouse purposes, without the written consent of Lessor or 
its successors or assigns first endorsed hereon, which such 
consent, shall not be unreasonably withheld, and if so assigned, 
let, underlet, used or permitted to be used without such written 
consent, Lessor may re-enter and re-let said premises and this 
Lease by such act shall be terminated as Lessor shall so deter-
mine and elect. Should Lessee sublet the whole or any part of 
said premises, or permit any other person than above, jointly 
with Lessee or otherwise, to occupy said premises or any part 
thereof without such written consent, neither acceptance of rent 
by Lessor from Lessee or any other person thereafter, nor failure 
on the part of Lessor for any particular period to take action 
on account of such breach or to enforce its rights, shall be 
desred a waiver of the breach, but the same shall be a continuing 
breach so long as such subtenancy or occupancy contin\jes. 
It is hereby agreed that all property of any kind 
placed in or on said premises shall be so placed at the sole risk 
of Lessee and those claiming through or under Lessee. Lessor 
shall not be liable for any loss of property by theft or burglary 
from said premises or the said building, or accidental damage 
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to person or property in or about said premises or such building 
resulting from electric lighting, wiring, rain, snow, steam or 
gas, unless caused by or due to negligence of Lessor, its agents, 
servants or employees. Lessor shall remedy defects in or damages 
to said premises with reasonable diligence following awareness by 
Lessor that such defects or damages exist. 
Lessee shall comply with all municipal, state, federal 
or other applicable laws and regulations respecting Lessee's use 
of said premises. 
It is further mutually agreed that if forty percent 
(ttTL) of said premises shall be destroyed by fire or other unavoidable 
casualty after the execution and before the termination hereof, 
this Lease shall terminate at the election of Lessor upon 
written notice to Lessee by Lessor; provided, however, that 
Lessee may terminate this Lease by written notice given Lessor 
within thirty (30) days following the occurrence of damage so caused, 
if within such period Lessor has not provided for substantial rest-
oration of said premises by a date no later than ninety-one (91) days 
following the date the damage occurred. If this Lease is not so 
terminated, then in case of any such destruction of or damage to 
said premises, a just proportion of the rent hereinbefore reserved 
according to the nature and extent of the damage sustained to 
said premises shall be suspended or abated until said premises shall 
have been put in proper condition for use and occupation. No 
compensation to or claim therefore by Lessee shall be made by reason 
of inconvenience or annoyance arising from necessity of repairing 
any portion of said premises or the said building however such 
necessity may occur. 
- A -
In the event said premises,""or any part thereof, or 
the vhole or any part of the said building shall be taken by right 
of-eminent domain or shall be "taken for any street or public use 
or the action of public authorities after the execution and before 
the termination hereof, this Lease may, at the election of Lessor 
or Lessee, be terminated; provided, however, in such event, Lessee 
shall" be-entitled to..compensation for improvements made to said 
premisesT-in-an-amount equal-to the compensation received by lessor 
in-respect-thereof and as a* result thereof, regardless of the term-
ination of this Lease. 
Entry in and upon said premises hereunder by Lessee 
shall constitute acceptance of said premises by Lessee and 
acknowledgment thereby that said premises are in good and satis-
factory condition when possession is so taken and in the condition 
in which said premises where represented to be or agreed to be 
placed by Lessor. Lessee shall care for said premises and cure 
any and all damage thereto effected by Lessee or Lessee's agents, 
clerks, servants and visitors, and shall quit and surrender said 
premises upon termination hereof in as good condition as reasonable 
use thereof will permit. Lessee shall make no alterations or 
improvements of or additions to said premises without the prior 
written consent of Lessor, except the improvements and additions 
now being provided by Lessee; all alterations or improvements of 
or additions to said premises made by either party hereto, excluding 
movable furniture and detachable trade fixtures placed in said 
premises by and at the expense of Lessee, shall be the property of 
Lessor and shall remain upon and be surrendered with said premises 
as a part thereof, at the termination of this Lease. 
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I t i s hereby agreed that i f Lessee shall default in 
unking any or a l l rental payments, keeping any or a l l teres , con-
ditions or covenants of th i s Lease, abandon said premises, beccw 
bankrupt or make an assignment for the benef i t of creditors, then 
and in any of said cases , Lessor may, af ter f ive (5) days, written 
notice allowing Lessee to cure any such default , re-enter upon 
said premises and, at Lessor's option, annul and make void this 
Lease as to a l l future rights of Lessee, anything herein to the 
contrary notwithstanding. Lessee covenants and agrees that in 
case of termination accomplished pursuant to provisions of th is 
paragraph, Lessee w i l l indemnify Lessor against a l l loss of rents 
or other payments which, but for such termination, Lessor would 
have been e n t i t l e d to receive under the terms and provisions of 
this Lease, and a l so against a l l attorney's fees and expenses i n -
curred by Lessor in enforcing any of the terms and provisions of 
this Lease. 
No-holding-over by Lessee,-however--long-continued, 
shal l operate to renewor extend'this Lease without Lessor's 
written.'Consent. I f Lessee halds possession of said premises 
after the term of th i s Lease or any renewal term thereof, Lessee 
shal l become a tenant from month to month, at the rent payable in 
the l a s t installment during the l a s t month of the term of th i s 
Lease, and upon the terms herein spec i f i ed , and sha l l continue to 
be such tenant u n t i l the tenancy sha l l be terminated by Lessor 
or unt i l Lessee sha l l have given Lessor a written not ice of at 
l eas t one (1) month of Lessee's intent ion to terminate the tenancy. 
Lessor s h a l l furnish such heating as may be required 
to maintain said premises in a comfortable and healthful condition 
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Lessee shall be obligated to pay all gas and heating bills, and 
Lessee shall also pay all pluibing bills and electric light 
charges. Lessee also agrees to pay all costs and attorney's fees 
and expenses that shall arise fran enforcing the terms and pro-
visions of this Lease. 
Lessee agrees to keep all glass, including plate 
window glass upon said premises. In the event of any breakage. 
Lessee shall not hold Lessor responsible for the replacement of 
same. 
Lessee agrees to save Lessor harmless from any 
liability by reason of personal injury to any person or property 
on or about said premises, and to carry indemnity insurance against 
said liability in a sun of not less than $100,000/$300,000, a copy 
of which insurance policy shall be given to Lessor upon execution 
of this Lease Agreement. 
Lessee agrees to pay any increase, as additional 
yearly rent, in and above the real properry taxes assessed on 
said premises by the Salt Lake County Assessor for the year ^98~ 
Said additional taxes, if any, shall be due first for the year 
-^986
 t an^ thereafter during the term of this Lease. 
It is understood and agreed that the covenants and 
agreements hereof shall inure to and be binding upcn the heirs, 
legal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties 
hereto. 
In the event, however, that, at any time during the 
term hereof, Lessor shall receive fran any third party a bona fide 
offer to purchase the premises at a price and on terms acaeptable 
to Lessor, Lessor shall give written notice of such price and 
terms to Lessee and Lessee shall have thirty (30) days thereafter 
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in which to execute a written agreement with Lessor for the 
purchase of the premises at such price and on such terns. If 
Lessor shall so notify Lessee and Lessee shall fail to execute 
such agreement within such thirty (30) day period, Lessor shall 
thereafter be free to sell the property to a third party making 
the offer on the same terms.and condiditons set forth in such 
offer, and if the property is so sold to such party, then all 
rights of Lessee under this section shall forthwith terminate. 
Nothing herein contained shall in any way limit 
the right of Lessor to transfer or convey the premises on the 
dissolution of Lessor's interests as herein stated, for nominal 
or no consideration, and Lessee shall have no rigfrt to purchase 
the property in the event of such transfer or conveyance. 
Lessee shall keep all of the premises and every part 
thereof and all buildings and other improvements at any time 
located thereon free and clear of any and all mechanics, material-
mens, and other liens for or arising our of or in connection with 
work or labor done, services performed, or materials or appliances 
used or furnished for or in connection with any operations of 
Lessee, any alteration, improvement or repairs or additions which 
Lessee may make or permit or cause to be made, or any work or 
construction by, for, or permitted by Lessee on or about the 
premises, or any obligations of any kind incurred by Lessee, and 
at all times promptly and fully to pay and discharge any and all 
claims on which any such lien may or could be based, and to 
indemnify Lessor and all of the premises and all buildings and 
improvements thereon against all such liens and claims of liens or 
suits, or other proceedings pertaining thereto. Lessee shall give 
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Lessor written notice no less than ten (10) days in advance 
of the conmencement of any construction, alterations, addition, 
improvement or repair estimated to cost in excess of $ 1,000.00 
in order that Lessor may post appropriate notices of Lessor*s 
non-responsibility. 
If Lessee desires to contest any such lien, it shall 
notify Lessor of its intention to do so within five (5). days 
after the filing of such lien. In such case, and provided that 
Lessee shall, on demand, protect Lessor by good and sufficient 
surety bond against any such lien and any cost, liability, or 
damage arising out of such contest. Lessee shall not be in de-
fault hereunder until ten (10) days after the final determination 
of the validity thereof, within which time Lessee shall satisfy 
and discharge such lien to the extent held valid; but the 
satisfaction of discharge of any such lien shall not, in any 
case, be delayed until the execution is had on any judgment rendered 
thereon, and such delay shall be a default of Lessee hereunder. 
In the event of any such contest, Lessee shall protect and in-
demnify Lessor against all loss, expense and damage resulting 
therefrom, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
Lessor grants to Lessee an option to- renew this 
Lease for-a period of • Five (5) years* afteirxhe" expiration of 
the term of this Lease at a rental to be negotiated at least 
sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of this Lease, with all 
other terms and conditions of the renewal lease to be the ssns as 
those herein. To exercise this option, Lessee must give Lessor 
written notice of intention to extend at least ninety (90) days 
before this lease expires. 
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IN WITNESS VHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed 
this Indenture as of the date f ixst above sec forth. 
LESSOR: 
3 ^ A 
M /M/UWf 
C/ Z: 
~-<f. . .
 t tUrt^ i*"»t i^r\rjc #c»± ' -
(Including Title) 
^ 
L E A S E 
THIS INEOTTURE OF LEASE rrade and entered in to as 
of the 1st day of August , 19 31 by and 
becween BEATRICE BARRCWS, R03ERT G. BARROWS. AND JUNE BURG, a i l 
ind iv idua ls of Sa l t Lake City, Utah, he re ina f t e r re fe r red to as 
"LESSOR," and Ellen K. Daskalas dba 
Ihe Pawn Shop , he re ina f t e r re fer red to as 
"LESSEE;" 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
That in considerat ion of the r e n t a l , covenants and 
agreements herein reserved and contained on the pa r t of the 
Lessee to be paid, performed and observed, Lessor does hereby 
l ea se , demise and l e t unto Lessee, and Lessee does hereby h i r e 
and take from Lessor, the premises known and described as : 
66 East 2nd South 
Sa l t Lake City, Utah 84111 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said premises for a period of 
Five (5) years beginning the 1st day of August 
19 81 . 
Lessee s h a l l pay Lessor the sum of $ 5,400.00 
payable a t che race of $ 450.00 per month, monthly in 
advance, on the 1st day of each and every month for a 
per iod of Sixty (60) months, commencing August 1 , 
19 81 . 
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Notices, payments and other cormuni cat ions herein 
provided or hereby contemplated shall be considered duly delivered 
when mailed by either registered or ordinary first-class mail, 
postage prepaid, to Lessor at 777 Barrows Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and to Lessee at 66 East and Second South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111
 # 
This Lease shall not be assigned, and neither said 
premises nor any part thereof shall be let or underlet, nor used 
nor permitted to be used for other than retail store or office 
or warehouse purposes, without the written consent of Lessor or 
its successors or assigns first endorsed hereon, which such 
consent, shall not be unreasonably withheld, and if so assigned, 
let, underlet, used or permitted to be used without such written 
consent, Lessor may re-enter and re-let said premises and :his 
Lease by such act shall be terminated as Lessor shall so deter-
mine and elect. Should Lessee sublet the whole or any par: of 
said premises, or permit any other person than above, jointly 
with Lessee or otherwise, to occupy said premises or any part 
thereof without such written consent, neither acceptance oE rent 
by Lessor from Lessee or any other person thereafter, nor failure 
on the part of Lessor for any particular period to take action 
on account of such breach or to enforce its rights, shall be 
deemed a waiver of the breach, bur the same shall be a continuing 
breach so long as such subtenancy or occupancy continues. 
It is hereby agreed that all property of any kind 
placed in or on said premises shall be so placed at the sole risk 
of Lessee and those claiming through or under Lessee. Lessor 
shall not be liable for any loss of property by theft or burglary 
from said premises or the said building, or accidental damage 
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to person or property in or about said premises or such building 
resulting frcm electric lighting, wiring, rain, snow, steam or 
gas, unless caused by or due to negligence of Lessor, its agents, 
servants or employees. Lessor shall remedy defects in or damages 
to said premises with reasonable diligence following awareness by 
Lessor that such defects or damages exist. 
Lessee shall comply with all municipal, state, federal 
or other applicable laws and regulations respecting Lessee's use 
of said premises. 
It is further mutually agreed that if forty percent 
(407.) of said premises shall be destroyed by fire or other unavoidable 
casualty after the execution and before the termination hereof, 
this Lease shall terminate at the election of Lessor upon 
written notice to Lessee by Lessor; provided, however, that 
Lessee may terminate this Lease by written notice given Lessor 
within thirty (30) days following the occurrence of damage so caused, 
if within such period Lessor has not provided for substantial rest-
oration of said premises by a date no later than ninety-cne (91) days 
following the date the damage occurred. If this Lease is not so 
terminated, then in case of any such destruction of or damage to 
said premises, a just proportion of the rent hereinbefore reserved 
according to the nature and extent of the damage sustained to 
said premises shall be suspended or abated until said premises shall 
have been put in proper condition for use and occupation. No 
compensation to or claim therefore by Lessee shall be made by reason 
of inconvenience or annoyance arising from necessity of repairing 
any portion of said premises or the said building however such 
necessity may occur. 
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In the event said premises, or any part thereof, or 
the fehole or any part of the said building shall be taken by right 
of eminent domain or shall be taken for any street or public use 
or the action of public authorities after the execution arid before 
the termination hereof, this Lease may, at the election of Lessor 
or Lessee, be terminated; provided, however, in such event, Lessee 
shall be entitled to compensation for improvements made to said 
premises, in an amount equal to the compensation received by Lessor 
in respect thereof and as a result thereof, regardless of the term-
ination of this Lease. 
Entry in and upon said premises hereunder by Lessee 
shall constitute acceptance of said premises by Lessee and 
acknowledgment thereby that said premises are in good and satis-
factory condition when possession is so taken and in the condition 
in which said premises where represented to be or agreed to be 
placed by Lessor. Lessee shall care for said premises and cure 
any and all damage thereto effected by Lessee or Lessee's agents, 
clerks, servants and visitors, and shall quit and surrenderr said 
premises upon termination hereof in as good condition as reasonable 
use thereof will permit. Lessee shall make no alterations or 
improvements of or additions to said premises without the prior 
written consent of Lessor, except the improvements and additions 
now being provided by Lessee; all alterations or improvements of 
or additions to said premises made by either party hereto, excluding 
movable furniture and detachable trade fixtures placed in said 
premises by and at the expense of Lessee, shall be the property of 
Lessor and shall remain upon and be surrendered with said premises 
as a part thereof, at the termination of this Lease. 
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I t i s hereby agreed that i f Lessee shall default in 
making any or a l l rental payments, keeping any or a l l terms, con-
ditions or covenants of this Lease, abandon said premises, become 
bankrupt or make an assignment for the benefit of creditors, then 
and in any of said cases, Lessor may, after five (5) days, written 
notice allowing Lessee to cure any such default, re-enter upon 
said premises and, at Lessor's option, annul and make void this 
Lease as to a l l future rights of Lessee, anything herein to the 
contrary notwithstanding. Lessee covenants and agrees that in 
case of termination accomplished pursuant to provisions of this 
paragraph, Lessee wil l inderinify Lessor against a l l loss of rents 
or other payments which, but for such termination, Lessor wuld 
have been enti t led to receive under the terms and provisions of 
this Lease, and also against a l l attorney's fees and expenses in-
curred by Lessor in enforcing any of the terms and provisions of 
this Lease. 
No holding over by Lessee, however long continued, 
shall operate to renew or extend this Lease without Lessor's 
written consent. If Lessee holds possession of said premises 
after the term of this Lease or any renewal term thereof, Lessee 
shall become a tenant from month to month, at the rent payable in 
the l a s t installment during the las t month of the term of this 
Lease, and upon the terms herein specified, and shall continue to 
be such tenant unt i l the tenancy shall be terminated by Lessor 
or unt i l Lessee shal l have given Lessor a written notice of at 
least one (1) month of Lessee's intention to terminate the tenancy. 
Lessor shal l furnish such heating as may be required 
to maintain said premises in a comfortable and healthful condition 
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Lessee shall be obligated to pay all gas and heating bills, and 
Lessee shall also pay all plurbing bills and electric light 
charges. Lessee also agrees to pay all costs and attorney's fees 
and expenses that shall arise from enforcing the teres and pro-
visions of this Lease. 
Lessee agrees to keep all glass, including place 
window glass upon said premises. In the event of any breakage, 
Lessee shall not hold Lessor responsible for the replacement of 
same. 
Lessee agrees to save Lessor harmless from any 
liability by reason of personal injury to any person or property 
on or about said premises, and to carry indemnity insurance against 
said liability in a sun of not less than $100,000/$300,000, a copy 
of which insurance policy shall be given to Lessor upon execution 
of this Lease Agreement. 
Lessee agrees to pay any increase, as additional 
yearly rent, in and shave the real property taxes assessed on 
said premises by the Salt Lake County Assessor for the year 1981 
Said additional taxes, if any, shall be due first for the year 
^986
 t and thereafter during the term of this Lease. 
It is understood and agreed that the covenants and 
agreements hereof shall inure to and be binding upon the heirs, 
legal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties 
hereto. 
In the event, however, that, at any time during the 
term hereof, Lessor shall receive from any third party a bona fide 
offer to purchase the premises at a price and on terms acceptable 
to Lessor, Lessor shall give written notice of such price and 
terms to Lessee and Lessee shall have thirty (30) days thereafter 
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in which to execute a written agreement with Lessor for the 
purchase of the premises at such price and on such terms. If 
Lessor shall so notify Lessee and Lessee shall fail to execute 
such agreement within such thirty (30) day period, Lessor shall 
thereafter be free to sell the property to a third parry making 
the offer on the same terms and condiditons set forth in such 
offer, and if the property is so sold to such party, then all 
rights of Lessee under this section shall forthwith terminate. 
Nothing herein contained shall in any way limit 
the right of Lessor to transfer or convey the premises on the 
dissolution of Lessor's interests as herein stated, for nominal 
or no consideration, and Lessee shall have no right to purchase 
the property in the event of such transfer or conveyance. 
Lessee shall keep all of the premises and every part 
thereof and all buildings and other improvements at any tine 
located thereon free and clear of any and all mechanics, material-
mens, and other liens for or arising out of or in connection with 
work or labor done, services performed, or materials or appliances 
used or furnished for or in connection with any operations of 
Lessee, any alteration, improvement or repairs or additions which 
Lessee may make or permit or cause to be made, or any work or 
construction by, for, or permitted by Lessee on or about the 
premises, or any obligations of any kind incurred by Lessee, and 
at all times promptly and fully to pay and discharge any and all 
claims on which any such lien may or could be based, and to 
indemnify Lessor and all of the premises and all buildings and 
improvements thereon against all such liens and claims of liens or 
suits, or other proceedings pertaining thereto. Lessee shall give 
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Lessor written notice no less than ten (10) days in advance 
of the commencement of any construction, alterations, addition, 
improvement or repair estimated to cost in excess of $ 1.C00.0Q 
in order that Lessor may post appropriate notices of Lessor's 
non-responsibility. 
If Lessee desires to contest any such lien, it shall 
notify Lessor of its intention to do so within five (5) days 
after the filing of such lien. In such case, and provided that 
Lessee shall, on demand, protect Lessor by good and sufficient 
surety bond against any such lien and any cost, liability, or 
damage arising out of such contest, Lessee shall not be in de-
fault hereunder until ten (10) days after the final deternirLation 
of the validity thereof, within which time Lessee shall satisfy 
and discharge such lien to the extent held valid; but the 
satisfaction of discharge of any such lien shall not, in any 
case, be delayed until the execution is had on any judgment rendered 
thereon, and such delay shall be a default of Lessee hereunder. 
In the event of any such contest, Lessee shall protect and in-
demnify Lessor against all loss, expense and damage resulting 
therefrom, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
Lessor grants to Lessee an option to renew this 
Lease for a period of Five (5) years after the expiration of 
the term of this Lease at a rental to be negotiated at least 
sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of this Lease, with all 
other terms and conditions of the renewal lease to be the same as 
those herein. To exercise this option, Lessee must give Lessor 
written notice of intention to extend at least ninety (90) days 
before this lease expires. 
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IN WITNESS VHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed 
this Indenture as of the date first above set forth. 
LESSEE: LESSOR: 
THE PAWN SHOP 
(Including Title) 
ATTEST: 
(Including Title) •j^ ~ o 3 - SJ--
0\,'~*<S *z^^ % 
.-ET-
C<.^ n ^ 
J O H N T. EVANS 
A T T O R N E Y AT LAW 
3IO SOUTH MAIN. SUITE 1330 
SALT LAICE CITY, UTAH 84101 
T4ufiJwofliaiqp'> 2?i-<£&87 
Jerome H. Mooney 
Mooney & Smith 
236 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake vs* Barrows et. al. 
Dear Jerry, 
Enclosed find a copy for your records of the owners' Election 
of Termination in the above action/ which I have prepared because 
of your assertion that one or more of your clients are still 
claiming a leasehold interest in the subject property as a result 
of a renewal you allege took place. You will recall that we 
discussed this by telephone on November 11, 1986. At that time I 
indicated to you that the Barrrows had not received notice from 
any lessee of intent to extend any Lease as required by its 
provisions, and you stated you would furnish me copies of 
such notices. When they did not arrive I contacted your office 
again in December and mentioned it again to Brant Wall in 
January when we spoke, but to date have still been furnished no 
evidence that any extensions were requested. 
As I told you it remains our position that any 
Leases were terminated with the filing by the RDA of this action 
in condemnation as argued by our Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed soon after commencement of the case, and that the tenants 
have remained in possession only under a month to month tenancy. 
In that light it would certainly be presumptuous to think that by 
allowing the tenants to remain in possession the owners in any 
way were acquiescing to the fact that the tenants were doing so 
under a new five year lease for the same rent as was paid during 
the prior five years, even though there was no negotiation or 
agreement thereto. Obviously, were any such Lease to be renewed 
it would not be for less that the full economic rent which the 
properties could bear. 
You also indicated you would send me an itemization of what 
improvements your tenants are claiming they should be compensated 
for, which I have not yet received. Without the above 
information it is impossible to discuss with you your clients 
claims, and I would appreciate receiving this as soon as 
possible. In the meantime, please do not misconstrue your 
clients' continued possession of the premises as acquiescence by 
the Barrows that there has been renewal of any prior Lease. 
EXHIBIT C 
Jerome H. Mooney 
February 2, 1987 
Page 2 
I will look forward to hearing from either you or Brant 
Very truly yours, 
JohA T. Evans, P.C. 
enclo 
cc: Brant Wall 
John T. Evans (#1013) 
Attorney for Defendants 
310 So. Main Street #1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 521-6383 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, a public entity, 
Plaintiff, 
ELECTION OF TERMINATION 
VS. 
JUNIATA IRENE BURGE, ROBERT 
D. BARROWS, JR., BEATRICE IRENE 
BARROWS, et al., 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C85-4017 
JUDGE: Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson 
—ooOoo— 
TO THE DEFENDANTS ELLEN K. DASKALAS, THE PAWN SHOP, JAMES 
ANDERSON, TERRY PANTELAKIS, LOANS AND SALES, INC., 
LEO VAN KOHMAN (HEREINAFTER "LESSEES") AND THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
Please take notice that due to the commencement by Plaintiff 
of the above entitled action in Eminent Domain to condemn the 
properties which are the subject hereof located respectively at 
#62, 64, and 66 East 200 South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, as 
more particularly described in the Complaint on file herein, and 
which are or have been occupied by the above named Lessees, the 
defendants JUNIATA IRENE BURGE, aka June Burge, and ROBERT D. 
BARROWS, JR.,aka Robert G. Barrows, and BEATRICE IRENE BARROWS 
(hereinafter "owners"), owners and Lessors of such premises, 
hereby elect to terminate, effective immediately, any and all 
Leases, if any, under which such Lessees may claim a right to 
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possession of such premises or to any proceeds arising out of the 
conveyance thereof/ whether pursuant to eminent domain or 
otherwise- Any such Lessees are hereby tenants from month to 
month and shall continue as such until such tenancy shall be 
terminated o 
Such election in no way constitutes an admission by the 
Owners that any such Leases are in effect nor that they have any 
duty to make such election/ nor that the Lessees would otherwise 
have any right to the occupancy of the premises nor to any 
proceeds arising out of the conveyance thereof/ which matters are 
hereby specifically denied by owners. 
Dated this 31st day of January/ 1987. 
c\Lr& n <-' a a-? John flr. Evans 
Attorney for Defendant-Owners  u 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ELECTION OF TERMINATION was mailed 
on this I* day of February, 1987, postage prepaid to the 
following: 
Loans & Sales, Inc. Harold A. Hintze 
Leo Van Komen Attorney at Law 
62 East 200 South St. 3319 No. University Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Terry Pantelakis 
dba AAA Jewelry & Loans 
66 East 200 South St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ellen K. Daskalas 
dba The Pawn Shop 
66 East 200 South St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Terry Pantelakis 
dba AAA Jewelry & Loans 
64 East 200 South St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James Anderson 
dba Jim's Place 
62% East 200 South St 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
William D. Oswald 
Fox, Edwards, Gardiner & Brown 
57 West 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Jerome H. Mooney 
Mooney & Smith 
236 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Brant Wall 
Attorney-at-Law 
800 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
B. Ray Zoll 
Attorney at Law 
5251 South Green St. #205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
(AM? 
